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Alexander Nye2
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study
February 24, 2020; Revised Date: April 8, 2022
Abstract
In the fall of 2008, due to the confluence of the Global Financial Crisis and years of structural
decline in the auto industry, Chrysler was nearing bankruptcy. Chrysler’s related finance
company, Chrysler Financial, was also in dire straits. On December 19, 2008, President Bush
announced the Automotive Industry Financing Program and that the US Treasury would
extend Chrysler a $4 billion Bridge Loan to give the company time to prepare a viable
restructuring plan. Two weeks later, the Treasury arranged $1.5 billion in low-interest
financing for Chrysler Financial to fund the securitization of new consumer car loans and the
facility subjected Chrysler Financial to several management restrictions, most of which
related to executive compensation. Chrysler Financial drew down the entire $1.5 billion
between January 16 and April 9, 2009. When Chrysler entered bankruptcy on April 30,
GMAC, General Motors’ related auto finance company, took over most of Chrysler Financial’s
business. Chrysler Financial continued to do business at a much smaller scale and Treasury
expected Chrysler Financial to wind down its business. Although the loan bore a five-year
term, Chrysler Financial paid off the loan in July after accessing another government
program, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) and continued to operate.
In December 2010, TD Bank bought Chrysler Financial from Cerberus, its major shareholder,
for $6.3 billion. Commentators do not have much to say on the impact of the government’s
1 This case
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aid for Chrysler Financial, although the $1.5 billion facility coincided with several months of
increased sales.
Keywords: AIFP, auto finance, Chrysler, Chrysler Financial, manufacturing, securitization,
TALF, TARP
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Emergency Assistance for
Chrysler Financial
At a Glance
In late 2008, due to the confluence of the
financial crisis and years of structural
decline in the auto industry, Chrysler, a
large auto manufacturer, was nearing
bankruptcy (Klier and Rubenstein 2012,
35–37). Treasury provided Chrysler
Holding (direct parent of Chrysler and
Chrysler Financial) with a $4 billion Bridge
Loan under the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 (Office of
Financial Stability 2018; Canis et al. 2009,
9; Nye 2021a). That funding was based on
the idea that saving auto finance companies
required saving the auto manufacturers to
which they were tied, and vice versa (COP
2009, 74–76).
Chrysler’s related finance company,
Chrysler Financial, was chafing under
nearly frozen asset-backed securities (ABS)
markets and asked the US government for
$2.5 billion in aid to fund new loans (Kolka
2009, 30). In January 2009, the US
government agreed to provide Chrysler
Financial $1.5 billion in financing to fund
new consumer automotive loans (Treasury
2009a).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To finance the day-to-day operations of
Chrysler Financial through the first quarter of 2009
by financing new consumer auto loans in connection
with the overall restructuring of Chrysler.
Announcement date
January 16, 2009
Operational date
January 16, 2009
Maturity date
January 16, 2014
Date repaid
July 14, 2009
Legal authority
Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008
(EESA), § 101 (a)(1), § 3 (9)
Rate
Year 1: 1-month LIBOR plus
100 basis points
Years 25: 1-month LIBOR
plus 150 basis points
Collateral
Two classes of variable
funding floating-rate assetbacked notes issued by a
trust holding liens on all
property related to the auto
loans financed by the TARP
loan to Chrysler Financial
Funder
US Department of the
Treasury
Participants

Amount used

Chrysler Financial Services
Americas LLC, Chrysler
Balloon Depositor II LLC,
Chrysler LB Receivables
Trust
$1.5 billion

This financing was structured in a manner that mimicked auto loan securitizations and was
offered to Chrysler Financial under favorable interest rates (Bansal and Krolicki 2008; Nye
2021b). The financing also imposed several restrictions on Chrysler Financial’s
management, mostly related to executive compensation.
The financing facility was announced and became operational on January 16, 2009 (Treasury
2009a). Once Chrysler Financial received the financing, Chrysler sales grew for several
months (Mitchell 2009). Chrysler Financial fully drew on the facility by April 9, 2009 (GAO
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2009c, 62). Upon finding that it would not receive additional aid, the company paid off the
loan on July 14, 2009, through its participation in the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility (TALF) (PR Newswire 2009e).
When Chrysler entered bankruptcy on April 30, 2009, Chrysler Financial did not join that
action (Kellogg and Bennett 2009). Instead, a large portion of its assets were sold to, and its
floorplan finance operations taken over by, GMAC, the financing partner of General Motors
(COP 2010, 59). Treasury indirectly supported GMAC and Chrysler Financial in the transition
(GMAC LLC 2009, PDF pp. 1–2; Docket 6273 2009, PDF p. 62). Chrysler Financial was
expected to be wound down, but Cerberus Capital Management, its ultimate parent, sold it
to TD Bank in 2010 (COP 2011, 9–12).
Summary Evaluation
The effectiveness of the aid to Chrysler Financial is not clear. Chrysler Financial survived
2009, and Chrysler survived long enough to enter a planned bankruptcy (Kellogg and
Bennett 2009). There were questions as to the extent the program actually benefited
Chrysler or Chrysler dealers (Reuters News 2009; Stein 2009). Commentators do not have
much to say on the impact of the government’s aid for Chrysler Financial, although the $1.5
billion facility coincided with several months of increased sales.
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Context: United States 2008–2009
GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted
to USD)

$14,559.5 billion in 2008
$14,628.0 billion in 2009
$48,383 in 2008
$47,100 in 2009
As of Q4, 2008:

Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior
debt)

Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
As of Q4, 2009:
Fitch: AAA
Moody’s: Aaa
S&P: AAA
$9,938.3 billion in total assets in 2008
$9,789.1 billion in total assets in 2009

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage
of GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage
of financial system
5-bank concentration of banking
system

68.3% in 2008
66.9% in 2009
Banking system assets equal to 30.5%
of financial system in 2008
Banking system assets equal to 30.2%
of financial system in 2009
44.9% of total banking assets in 2008
44.3% of total banking assets in 2009

Foreign involvement in banking
system

18% of total banking assets in 2008
16% of total banking assets in 2009

0% of banks owned by the state in
2008
0% of banks owned by the state in
2009
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2008
Existence of deposit insurance
100% insurance on deposits up to
$250,000 in 2009
Sources: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; World Bank Bank Regulation and
Supervision Survey; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; Bloomberg.
Government ownership of banking
system

225

Journal of Financial Crises

I.

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

Overview

Background
By the time that two of America’s largest auto makers, General Motors (GM) and Chrysler,
obtained a $17.4 billion financing commitment from the George W. Bush administration on
December 19, 2008, they had been in dire straits for several years (Klier and Rubenstein
2012, 35–36; Paulson 2010, 361). This was due to a combination of declining market share,
miscalculated labor arrangements, slim profit margins, and reliance on gas-guzzling vehicles
for profit (COP 2011, 9–11; Canis et al. 2009, 1–2). The Global Financial Crisis had been
raging for more than a year, and consumer confidence and access to credit was evaporating
(COP 2011, 911). The companies and the rest of the American auto industry were insolvent
and unable to fund themselves (COP 2011, 911).
Credit was and is the lifeblood of the American auto industry (Canis et al. 2009, 4650).
Dealers use cheap financing to buy cars for their showrooms. Before the crisis,
manufacturers themselves typically provided this “floorplan financing” through captive (or
de facto captive) finance companies such as General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
for GM, Ford Motor Credit for Ford, and Chrysler Financial for Chrysler (Canis et al. 2009,
46–50).3 Credit is equally important to fund consumer purchases, because “90 percent of
consumers finance automobile purchases through loans, either directly from the
manufacturers” financing arms or through third-party financial institutions” (COP 2009, 7).
Both kinds of credit typically take the form of loans from third-party banks and the same
captives. If these two kinds of financing are not available, sales in the US auto market can
collapse (Canis et al. 2009, 46–50).
Before the crisis, the companies providing auto financing frequently obtained funding by
securitizing the loans; for example, by packaging loans into asset-backed securities (ABS),
bonds that are sold to provide immediate cash that can be re-lent (GM Financial n.d.). Prior
to the crisis, securitization financed about a third of all US auto loans (Campbell et al. 2011,
PDF p. 3).
Chrysler Financial: From Crown Jewel to Chief Liability
In 2007, Daimler-Chrysler sold an 81% stake in Chrysler Holding (the direct parent company
of Chrysler and Chrysler Financial) to private-equity company Cerberus Capital Management
(Cerberus) (Bel Bruno and AP Newswires 2007). The sale of Chrysler Holding does not
appear to have been caused by the crisis, but it was complicated by the crisis, making it
difficult to access the needed funding (Bel Bruno and AP Newswires 2007).

In 2008, GMAC, which was GM’s former captive auto finance company, and Chrysler Financial were both
controlled by Cerberus Capital Management (Cerberus), but each was still informally acting as a captive finance
company for their respective brands (COP 2010, 9)
3
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Daimler was losing money on Chrysler and expected losses to continue to grow due to
Chrysler’s future benefit liabilities (Isidore 2007). For that reason, it sold Chrysler for onefifth of what it had paid nine years earlier (Isidore 2007). 4 After the sale, DaimlerChrysler
and DaimlerChrysler Financial were renamed Chrysler and Chrysler Financial, respectively
(Isidore 2007; Chrysler Financial Auto Securitization Trust 2009-B 2009, 16). This split from
Daimler would cause Chrysler Financial to lose its business providing auto financing for
Mercedes and Maybach in North America.
Credit conditions were bad and getting worse by fall of 2008. From early 2008 through at
least mid-2009, the market for ABS was essentially nonexistent (COP 2010, 34, 55). Chrysler
Financial had tried to renew its $30 billion line of credit from 22 large banks but had to settle
for just $24 billion on August 4, 2008. Credit was also growing increasingly expensive (Koons
2008). The banks lent the $24 billion at an interest rate of between LIBOR plus 110 basis
points and LIBOR plus 225 basis points, a rate that was unexpectedly high and which would
have made offering attractive consumer financing difficult (Rappaport 2008; Boudette
2008). Also, as a condition of its new financing, Chrysler Financial rapidly tightened lending
requirements, increased interest rates, stopped leasing vehicles to consumers, and began
charging Chrysler dealerships additional fees for older unsold inventory (Banks 2008).
These factors crippled Chrysler’s ability to sell vehicles, which had been under pressure since
early 2008 when Cerberus had directed it to reduce the number of dealerships. (Banks
2008). It is especially important to note that Chrysler Financial had a significantly lower
debt-to-equity ratio than its peers, but Treasury considered its situation to be worse than
that of GMAC because all of its outstanding debt was set to mature in July 2009 (COP 2010,
22; Picarillo and Laterza 2009).
The Path to Aiding Chrysler Financial
Throughout 2008, automotive sales for the Big Three—GM, Chrysler, and Ford—rapidly
declined due to a combination of factors: “rising gasoline prices, tightening credit markets,
eroding consumer confidence, high unemployment, and discretionary spending concerns”
(COP 2009). Automobile sales in the United States and abroad were down 18 percent lower
than the previous year’s. The tightened credit market was particularly significant because
the overwhelming majority of consumers finance auto purchases, directly through the
manufacturer’s financing arm or from a third party. (COP 2009,7). “The particularly weak
condition of the financing arms of Chrysler and GM—Chrysler Financial and GMAC,
respectively—exacerbated the manufacturers’ plummeting sales as the credit markets
seized up” (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2019; COP 2009, 7).
In response to the manufacturers’ requests, in December, the Bush administration
announced a $4 billion Bridge Loan to Chrysler Holding to pay for Chrysler’s operating costs
and a $13.4 billion loan to GM under the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) (see Nye
2021a for more on the late-2008 funding for the auto industry; Kolka 2009, 30). As discussed
in Key Design Decision No. 1, use of TARP funds was controversial and at first President Bush
4

Daimler had paid $37 billion for Chrysler, but sold the automaker to Cerberus for $7.4 billion (Isidore 2007).
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and Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr., did not believe that Congress had authorized
TARP funds to be used for an auto bailout. However, the Bush administration ultimate
determined that the statute was broad enough to provide relief. Among other arguments,
Treasury relied on the nexus between GM and Chrysler and their respective finance
companies, GMAC and Chrysler Financial, and the critical role that financing played in the
industry to support funding under TARP (COP 2009, 70; Wiggins, Metrick, and Nye 2021).
At the end of December 2008, Treasury also promised up to $6 billion in aid for Chrysler
Financial’s competitor, GMAC (Shepardson 2009). Officials from the two Chrysler companies
complained that the aid put Chrysler Financial, and therefore Chrysler, at a “competitive
disadvantage” (Shepardson 2009).5 On January 16, 2009, days after the complaints were
aired to the press, Treasury announced $1.5 billion in aid from TARP to Chrysler Financial
as a measure to improve consumer access to credit and prop up auto sales Treasury 2009a).
Program Description
Use of the Federal Reserve’s Broad-Based Liquidity Programs
In an attempt to stabilize itself, Chrysler accessed two broad Federal Reserve programs that
assisted Chrysler Financial’s auto finance business. The Commercial Paper Funding Facility
(CPFF), which launched on October 27, 2008, was designed to backstop the commercial
paper market and revive term lending. The CPFF provided funding for third parties to
purchase highly rated unsecured and asset-backed commercial paper from eligible issuers
(Wiggins 2020). Between October 27, 2008, and September 8, 2009, $4.82 billion of Chrysler
Financial Auto Conduit Receivables were purchased under the auspices of the CPFF
(BdofGov n.d.).
Another broad Fed program accessed by Chrysler Financial was the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF), which was intended to stimulate the renewed issuance of
consumer and small business loans by facilitating the securitization of such loans at more
normal interest rate spreads (Rhee 2020). Specifically, the TALF allowed eligible institutions
to borrow from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) using, as collateral, among
other types, newly-issued auto loan asset-backed securities (ABS) (Rhee 2020). Chrysler
Financial issued enough auto ABS, some funded under TALF, so that on July 14, 2009 it was
able to repay the remaining principal, interest, and amounts due under the vested notes
owing with respect to the Chrysler Financial Trust Loan. (GAO 2009c; Langlois 2009). It
seems the conditions and cost of the TALF loans may have been preferable to continuing to
pay the fees associated with, and comply with, the executive compensation restrictions of
the Chrysler Financial Trust Loan.
The Two Interventions Customized for Chrysler

5 As

part of Chrysler’s requests for aid from TARP, Chrysler had asked for $2.5 billion to aid Chrysler Financial’s
floorplan and consumer financing operations (Kolka 2009, 30). This request was subsequently lowered to $1.5
billion in aid that would be allocated to only consumer financing (Kolka 2009, 30).
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Two government interventions were customized for Chrysler and Chrysler Financial. In
early 2009 Chrysler Financial accessed a $1.5 billion lending facility from Treasury under
the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) (Office of Financial Stability 2018). After
Chrysler Financial drew down that funding, the company became involved in Treasury’s
restructuring of Chrysler via the bankruptcy code; this led to the second intervention. (COP
2010, PDF pp. 26, 46)de Starting in late April 2009, as part of Chrysler’s bankruptcy
proceedings, Treasury facilitated the replacement of Chrysler Financial by GMAC as
Chrysler’s auto finance partner (Treasury n.d., 5; COP 2010, 27,49).6
Treasury’s $1.5 billion Funding Facility under TARP
Pursuant to a loan agreement, dated January 14, 2009, between Treasury and Chrysler LB
Receivables Trust, a bankruptcy-remote trust established by Chrysler Financial (“Chrysler
Financial Trust”), Treasury provided $1.5 billion in aid for Chrysler Financial that would fund
a new pool of Chrysler Financial ABS (the Chrysler Financial Trust Loan) (Bansal and Krolicki
2008; Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 5; Treasury 2009a). The
ultimate purpose of the program was the same as the original $17.4 billion Bridge Loan
program that provided funding to GM and Chrysler: to provide financing to “restore stability
to the domestic automobile industry in the United States” and “restore liquidity to its
business” (Nye 2021a; Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 5). The
proximate purpose of the program was to finance retail loans made by Chrysler Financial on
or after January 1, 2009, with respect to the purchase of Chrysler vehicles, including cars,
light-duty trucks, and recreational vehicles to “stimulate manufacturing and sales” of such
vehicles Treasury n.d.; Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 5). It was
thought that the extension and securitization of new consumer loans would temporarily help
keep Chrysler Financial and thus, Chrysler, afloat (Treasury n.d.; Chrysler Financial Services
and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 5, 47–73; Dombey and Simon 2009). Tangentially, this would
preserve jobs of American workers employed directly by the manufacturers and in related
industries and “safeguard the ability of the [manufacturers and their affiliates] to provide
retirement and health care benefits for their retirees and their dependents” (Chrysler
Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 5).
Authority: Funding for the Chrysler Financial Trust Loan came from Treasury’s Automotive
Industry Financing Program (AIFP), which Treasury authorized under TARP pursuant to the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA). This was the same authority

6 On March 30, 2009, Treasury had released a Determination of Viability for GM and Chrysler (Treasury 2009b).

In the Chrysler document, the US government announced its expectations for Chrysler Financials’ future
(Treasury 2009b, PDF p. 5). In spite of Chrysler’s reliance on Chrysler Financial for nearly half of its sales,
Treasury cited the possibly divergent customer mix, “separation and independence of Chrysler Financial and
increased credit standards,” and “substantial financing challenges” faced by Chrysler Financial as causes for its
suggestion that Chrysler’s “future demand may depend on [its] finding alternate lending sources” (Treasury
2009b, PDF p. 5). This meant that Chrysler would likely further distance itself from Chrysler Financial, and
Chrysler Financial would have to survive as a third-party auto finance company that would not follow Chrysler
into the bankruptcy process (COP 2010, 27, 49).
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Treasury relied on for all of its direct aid to the auto industry (Office of Financial Stability
2018).
Loan Terms: Treasury agreed to loan up to $1.5 billion to Chrysler Financial Trust. Treasury
would make advances under the Chrysler Financial Loan commitment in specified amounts
on several funding dates specified in the agreement upon Chrysler Financial Trust’s request.
Once advances were repaid, they could not be re-borrowed. The initial funding date was
January 16, 2009 (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 60).7 The loan was
for a term of five years and all advances were fully repayable on January 16, 2014, along with
any outstanding interest and/or fees (Treasury n.d.). Advances could be prepaid by Chrysler
Financial Trust in whole or in part. However, in the event of any prepayment, Chrysler
Financial Trust would be responsible for making Treasury whole for any losses or costs that
it suffered in redeploying funds maintained for advances (Chrysler Financial Services and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7, 11).
Each advance under the loan was evidenced by two classes of Variable Funding Floating Rate
Asset Backed Notes (promissory notes) issued to Treasury by Chrysler Financial Trust
(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 10, 137, 145).8 (See Figure 1.) Class
A promissory notes required Chrysler Financial Trust to pay Treasury the outstanding
principal and interest on the advance on a monthly basis (Chrysler Financial Services and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 90, 171172; Treasury 2009a, PDF pp. 1–2). Principal and interest
accrued at a rate of LIBOR plus 100 basis points for the first year and LIBOR plus 150 basis
points for the second through fifth years. For Class A notes, overdue installments of interest
accrued interest at a penalty rate of LIBOR plus 4% for the first year and LIBOR plus 4.5%
for years two through five (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 184).

We have not been able to determine other funding dates, or their frequency, as this information was included
on Appendix A to the agreement, which is fully redacted in the public copy of the agreement. However, we do
know that Chrysler Financial Trust drew on the facility multiple times before April 9, 2009 (Chrysler Financial
Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 60; GAO 2009a, 62).
8 Treasury could have received a third class of these notes (called Class C notes) in the event that Chrysler
Financial wanted to deploy supplemental loans that enhanced the credit of the ABS master trust through
overcollateralization (although it is not clear whether these loans would have been extended by the US
government or some other entity) (Treasury 2009a, PDF p. 2). However, Chrysler Financial appears to have
chosen not to draw on these supplemental loans (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 154162, 171–179). The Class C notes appear to have carried the same interest rate and many of the terms of the
other notes (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 154162, 171179).
7
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Figure 1: Attributes of Promissory Notes
Note category
Principal

Class A Variable Funding Floating
Rate Asset Backed Notes
• Minimum principal: $100 million
• Maximum principal: $1.5 billion
• Actual principal: $1.5 billion

Interest rate

•
•

Term

•
•

Purpose

•

Security (Class
A and Class B
notes)

•
•
•
•

Year 1: 1-month LIBOR plus 100
basis points (bps)
Years 2–5: 1-month LIBOR plus 150
bps
(penalty rate adds 300 bps)
Five years (beginning January 16,
2009)
To enable the securitization trust to
fund retail loans made on or after
January 1, 2009, to finance the
purchase of Chrysler automobiles
All pooled receivables and related
property
The collection account and its
contents
Hedges entered or acquired by
Chrysler Financial Trust
Any right to payment facilitated by
the financing

Class B Variable Funding Floating Rate
Asset Backed Notes
• $75 million, with $15 million vested at
closing and on each anniversary of the
loan closing in which the loan is
outstanding
• Year 1: 1-month LIBOR plus 100 bps
• Years 2–5: 1-month LIBOR plus 150
bps
• (penalty rate adds 300 bps)
•
•

•

Five years (beginning January 16,
2009)
Issued as additional consideration for
the Treasury in lieu of warrants, to
fulfill the EESA Section 113(d)(1)(b)
requirement
Same as Class A

Source: Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009.

Class B notes, also issued to Treasury by Chrysler Financial Trust in connection with all
advances, functioned as additional consideration, fulfilling Treasury’s requirement that it
had to receive “a warrant for common or preferred stock, or a senior debt instrument” when
it purchased troubled assets from financial institutions under EESA Section 113(d)(1)(b)
(EESA, § 113(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 179).). Class B notes had
the same terms and maturity dates as the Class A Notes. Treasury received 5% of the
maximum loan amount, or $15 million, at closing and on each anniversary of the closing, up
to a total of $75 million. The Class B notes ranked below the Class A notes in the payment
waterfall (See Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Payment Priority
Name and type of
obligation
Trustee fees

Servicing fees
Hedging fees
Interest, fees, and
costs of relevant
Notes
Principal on relevant
Notes

Trustee fees
overflow
Termination fees
under hedges
Distributions to
Trust certificate
holders

Principal

Recipient

Priority

Assessed monthly, but
must in total be less than
or equal to $100,000 per
annum
The servicer fee assessed
and any unpaid monthly
servicer fees
Net payments assessed
monthly (excluding
termination payments)
Assessed monthly

Pro rata among priority 1 to the Indenture
Trustee and the Owner Trustee

1

Pro rata among priority 1 to the Servicer
(Chrysler Financial)

1

Hedge counterparties

2

Class A note holders (Treasury); Class B
note holders (Treasury); Class C note
holders (Chrysler Retail Residual
Depositor LLC, which could then transfer
them to Chrysler Retail Residual Trust)
Class A note holders (Treasury); Class B
note holders (Treasury); Class C note
holders (Chrysler Retail Residual
Depositor LLC, which can then transfer
them to Chrysler Retail Residual Trust)
Indenture Trustee and Owner Trustees

3

Hedge counterparties

6

Certificate holder (assumed to be Chrysler
Financial)

7

Outstanding principal
amount under relevant
notes until said
outstanding principal has
been reduced to zero
Any fees owed beyond the
$100,000 per annum cap

4

5

Source: Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009
Collateral/Security: The loan and Treasury’s right to payment of principal and interest under
the notes were secured by all the property of the Chrysler Trust, the pool of loans that it
purchased and the related receivables, the funding account and any hedges. These were held
by the Indenture Trustee, who held perfected first-priority liens on all of Chrysler Trust’s
property for Treasury’s benefit (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 15,
72, 79–81, 288–289). 9
Mechanics: As illustrated in Figure 3, the legal structure of the loan mimicked that of an auto
securitization, with the US Treasury playing the role of the bond-buying investor. (See Figure
2). Proceeds of the loan were received by Chrysler Trust, a bankruptcy-remote ABS master

9 The indenture trustee’s (Deutsche Bank Trust Company

Americas) role was to act as trustee on behalf of those
holding the various notes (Class A, Class B, and Class C) issued by Chrysler Trust (Chrysler Financial Services
and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 60). The indenture trustee had a number of other duties to Treasury and Chrysler
Trust under an indenture agreement (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 79–81).
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trust (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 171172). The Chrysler
Financial Loan promoted the sale of Chrysler vehicles through the following process:
Figure 3: Simplified Mechanics of the Facility
Source: Central Statistics Office 2019.

Source: Created by YPFS; based on Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009.
Chrysler Financial would make loans to consumers buying Chrysler vehicles, then bundle
these loan receivables into a pool that it would sell to a bankruptcy-remote special purpose
entity (SPE) created for this purpose, which was called Chrysler Balloon Depositor II LLC
(the “SPE” or the “Depositor”) (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 53,
64–65, 67). The SPE purchased the pooled receivables from Chrysler Financial using funds
it received from Chrysler Financial Trust, which held the proceeds from the Treasury loan
(Chrysler Financial and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 137–141, 274). Chrysler Financial Trust then
issued to Treasury two classes of notes providing for the repayment of the loan and for
additional consideration for Treasury. Thus, Chrysler Financial funded a new pool of
Chrysler Financial ABS, with Chrysler Financial Trust acting as a purchaser for auto loan
receivables (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 5, 171173, 225–230;
Bansal and Krolicki 2008). This allowed Chrysler Financial to originate new loans and leases
for consumers at better terms, increasing its volume from the low levels of late 2008
(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 10, 47–73, 242–257).
Chrysler Financial serviced the pooled receivables held by Chrysler Financial Trust and used
the related proceeds from those receivables to fund the administrative fees associated with
the securitization, Chrysler Financial’s servicing fees, hedging costs, and the Chrysler
Financial Trust’s loan repayments to Treasury as the holder of Chrysler Financial Trust’s
notes (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 75–97, 115–117, 283).
Parent Company Guarantee: The loan documents also included a guarantee agreement under
which Chrysler Financial’s parent company, Chrysler Holding, guaranteed penalties that
Chrysler Financial might become obligated to pay if it violated “dividend and distribution
restrictions” contained in the loan agreement Treasury n.d., PDF p. 3; Chrysler Financial
Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 237–241). We have not been able to determine the
substance of these restrictions; they have been redacted in the loan documents released to
the public (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 342; Treasury 2009a, PDF
p. 3).
Executive Compensation Requirements: The executive compensation requirements imposed
by the loan aimed to limit the benefits and compensation enjoyed by Chrysler Financial
senior employees and executives. These restrictions were of two types: (1) regulations
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regarding compensation to senior executive officers issued by the Treasury in connection
with EESA programs10 and (2) restrictions contained in the loan agreement. It is not clear,
however, what restrictions were contained in the loan agreement, because these terms have
been redacted from the public version of the agreement. However, the term sheet for the
Chrysler Financial Trust loan (Loan Term Sheet) included the following:
(A) Chrysler Financial shall comply with EESA terms,
(B) Chrysler Financial shall comply in all respects with the limits on annual executive
compensation deductibles imposed by Section 162(m)(5) of the Code, as applicable;
(C) Chrysler Financial shall reduce by 40.00% the aggregate amount of bonus
compensation that may be paid to Senior Executive Officers [the top five highest-paid
officers] or Senior Employees [the next 20 most highly compensated employees] in
fiscal year 2009 from the aggregate bonus compensation actually paid to such
employees in 2007, subject to certain adjustments;
(D) Chrysler Financial shall not adopt or maintain any compensation plan that would
encourage manipulation of its reported earnings to enhance the compensation of any
of its employees; and
(E) Chrysler Financial shall maintain all suspensions and other restrictions of
contributions to Benefit Plans that are in place or initiated as of the closing date”
Treasury n.d., PDF pp. 3–4).
In particular, the 40% bonus reduction appeared to be unusually restrictive compared to
similar TARP programs at the time. Treasury press releases referred to the proposed
executive compensation terms as “enhanced restrictions on executive compensation”
Treasury 2009a).11
Corporate Governance Terms: Pursuant to the loan agreement, Chrysler Financial was
required to suspend payment of dividends. It also had to comply with corporate governance
requirements imposed by EESA, which included, a semi-annual risk review by the
compensation committee and certain disclosures.12
Reporting Requirements and Administrative Burden: The reporting requirements included in
the loan between the US Treasury and Chrysler Financial Trust were limited to standard

These terms were automatically imposed under 31 CFR 30 and Section 111 of EESA on organizations that
received TARP money (Treasury 2009d; EESA 2008).These rules defined Senior Executive Officer (SEO) as the
top five highest-paid officers and Senior Employees as the next 20 most highly compensated employees. Among
other conditions, the rules prohibit or limit cash compensation, total compensation, short-term stock
incentives, severance payments, and the adoption of any new benefit plan for SEOs who did not comply with
the rules.
11 As part of the loan agreements, Chrysler Financial and its individual SEOs and executive officers were
required to sign individual waivers foregoing any claims against the company and Treasury for any changes to
any compensation (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 12 (Sec. O), 39–43.)
12 See pages A8-A9 of the Special Master’s letter for a list of these requirements (Feinberg 2009, 11–12).
10
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conditions (notification of defaults, litigation, changes in control, right of lender to perform
due diligence, etc.) (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 22–31).
Replacing Chrysler Financial with GMAC
In early April 2009, Treasury realized that Chrysler’s bankruptcy filing would cause
Chrysler’s bankers to withdraw all $22 billion of its remaining credit lines (Rattner 2011,
147). Given its significant relationship with Chrysler and other concerns regarding the
company, Treasury sought to arrange a more secure financing source for Chrysler. A plan
was proposed to have GMAC replace Chrysler Financial. Chrysler Financial would go into
“runoff mode,” continuing to hold the loans that it had made but not making new ones (COP
2011, 11; COP 2010, 48; Rattner 2011, 147). Treasury would not save Chrysler Financial.
Chrysler made this plan public, announcing at the time that it “will enter into an agreement
with GMAC that will provide dealer and customer financing after bankruptcy, in lieu of
Chrysler Financial, which agreed to cooperate in the transition of its current dealer
agreements to GMAC” (Canis et al. 2009, PDF p. 31; Docket 1261 2009, PDF pp. 8–11).13
Outcomes
Outcomes of the $1.5 billion Facility
Chrysler began to feel the benefits of the loan soon after implementation. From January to
February of 2009, the number of loans written by Chrysler Financial “more than quadrupled”
(Mitchell 2009). Chrysler Financial and its parent began to announce that loans would
become more available and lending conditions would be relaxed. The companies also
announced that the proceeds of the loan would be used to support an up to 60 month, 0%
interest loan program along with other incentive programs (Shepardson and Priddle 2009;
Mitchell 2009). As of early February, however, Chrysler’s dealers complained that many of
their customers were still unable to access these incentive programs, as they were only
“available to customers with top-tier credit ratings” (Kellogg 2009a).
Although the aid from the US government was lightening the financial load on Chrysler
Financial, the company continued to be squeezed; Chrysler Financial’s financial burden was
increasingly felt by Chrysler and its dealerships. Less than a month after the Treasury loan
closed, the Wall Street Journal reported that Chrysler Financial “has focused increasingly on
protecting its own bottom line, often at the expense of the auto company” (Kellogg 2009a).
Chrysler Financial continued to face significant problems, as evidenced by the fact that it
asked for additional TARP funds in March 2009 (Kellogg 2009b). The Washington Post
reported that Treasury offered Chrysler Financial an additional $750 million in loans
(Krisher and Manning 2009). However, the Associated Press wrote that a “government
official with knowledge of the negotiations” said Chrysler Financial was unwilling to agree
to the accompanying executive pay cuts Treasury demanded (Krisher and Manning 2009).
The deal never came together or fell apart during negotiations over these pay cuts and soon

13 For more details of the terms of Chrysler’s transition

of its auto financing relationship from Chrysler Financial
to GMAC see the Master Auto Finance Agreement at Chrysler Group LLC and GMAC 2009, PDF pp. 212–222.
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Chrysler Financial indicated that it no longer needed such aid from the government (Krisher
and Manning 2009).
Chrysler Financial reached the $1.5 billion maximum loan amount by April 9, 2009, and
subsequently returned to raising lending rates, this time by an average of more than 1%
(Kellogg 2009b; GAO 2009c, 62). The company repaid the loan in full (with interest and fees)
quickly and made the last payment on July 14, 2009 (GAO 2009c, 62, 132). As a result,
taxpayers received an extra $22.4 million (beyond the $1.5 billion they lent) (GAO 2009c,
134). Chrysler Financial stated that its speedy repayment was due to its successful
participation in the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (Langlois, 2009).
Outcomes of GMAC’s Replacement of Chrysler Financial
With the filing of Chrysler’s Chapter 11 petition at the end of April 2009, Chrysler Financial’s
funding sources dried up (Docket 482 2009, PDF p. 8). As a result, Chrysler Financial stopped
providing floorplan financing to dealers and financing to consumers (Kellogg 2009b).
Chrysler Financial “announced that it would no longer provide additional advances under
the wholesale lines of such Dealers,” and Chrysler’s attorney worried about the fact that
Chrysler Financial had liens “on most of these Dealers’ assets [including, among other things,
new and used cars, parts, and other inventory]” (Docket 482 2009, PDF p. 8–9). Even worse,
Chrysler Financial’s contracts with dealers apparently barred any party “from placing new
liens on Chrysler Financial’s collateral without a waiver from Chrysler Financial” (Docket
482 2009, PDF p. 8–9). Chrysler Financial asserted that imposing new liens, like those of
GMAC, would “result in an event of default under the financing documents between Chrysler
Financial and the Dealers,” permitting Chrysler Financial “to exercise its remedies against
the Dealers and their assets" (Docket 482 2009, PDF p. 8–9).14 Chrysler’s attorneys asserted
that Chrysler’s “businesses cannot survive without financing for their Dealers and the
Debtors cannot procure this substitute financing without the consent of Chrysler Financial”
(Docket 482 2009, PDF pp. 8–9, 14). Accordingly, “Chrysler had to convince Chrysler
Financial to waive the ‘new liens’ prohibition” in order for the GMAC transition to proceed
(Docket 483 2009, PDF p. 12).
Treasury effectively subsidized Chrysler’s solution to this problem by increasing the $4.1
billion debtor-in-possession loan15 that it had provided to Chrysler by $896 million, some of
which Chrysler would use to pay Chrysler Financial to waive a number of its potential claims

14 In theory, convincing Chrysler Financial to waive these liens would not be difficult; the security from Chrysler

Financial’s various pre-existing auto finance contracts with Chrysler protected it from some of the negative
effects of a Chrysler bankruptcy. The 2007 Master Auto Finance Agreement governing Chrysler Financial’s
services for Chrysler also made $1.5 billion ($500 million in cash and a $1 billion Chrysler note pledged to
Chrysler Financial) in collateral available to Chrysler Financial in case of certain bankruptcy events and PBGC
demands (Docket 482 2009, PDF p. 10). However, Chrysler’s obligations toward Chrysler Financial outstripped
the $1.5 billion by the time of the April 30, 2009, bankruptcy filings (Docket 482 2009, PDF p. 10).
15 The debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan was a three-way agreement between Chrysler, Treasury, and Export
Development Canada (EDC) dated May 5, 2009 (Chrysler LLC and Lenders 2009, PDF p. 21). See Nye 2021b for
details.
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against Chrysler once Chrysler had successfully restructured (Chrysler LLC and Lenders
2009, PDF p. 21; Docket 1903 2009; Docket 6273 2009, PDF p. 62).
Although Treasury originally intended for GMAC to acquire all of Chrysler Financial’s assets,
Treasury noticed that Chrysler Financial had substantial debts coming due in July 2009 (COP
2010, 26). To avoid exposing GMAC to these debts, Treasury determined that it would
finance “GMAC’s acquisition of only a part of Chrysler Financial’s business.”
In July 2009, the Treasury and Chrysler also amended the documents underpinning the $4
billion in Bridge Loan from late 2008 as part of the transition (Chrysler Holding and Treasury
2008, PDF pp. 383–401). The amendment required Chrysler to pay Treasury 40% of any
distributions Chrysler Holding received from its stake in Chrysler Financial, including the
first $1.38 billion (Chrysler Holding and Treasury 2008, PDF pp. 383–401).
Outcome of Winding Down the Old Chrysler(s)
By September 2009, Treasury issued a directive to Chrysler Financial “to liquidate its
business” and the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation noted that Chrysler
Financial planned to wind down operations by the end of 2011 (GAO 2009b, 6; Feinberg
2009). In late spring 2010, Cerberus offered Treasury $1.9 billion to settle Chrysler Holding’s
debts and facilitate Treasury’s exit from its potential 40% interest in Chrysler Financial’s
proceeds (COP 2011, 16; Treasury 2010). Chrysler Holding still owed Treasury $3.5 billion
under the Bridge Loan, and Treasury wished to exit Chrysler Holding quickly, hoping to
recoup some revenues for the taxpayers (COP 2011, 16). Treasury subsequently accepted
the offer on May 17, 2010 (COP 2011, 16). On December 21, 2010, TD Bank announced that
it would buy Chrysler Financial from Cerberus for about $6.3 billion (COP 2011, 16–17).
Chrysler Financial was rebranded as TD Auto Finance and as of the date of this case continues
to operate (TD Auto Finance 2015). The alliance between Chrysler and GMAC did not last
and was terminated in early 2013 when Chrysler replaced GMAC with Chrysler Capital, a
captive full-service finance provider for Chrysler and associated companies executed in
connection with Santander Bank (Chrysler Group 2014, 155; Chrysler Capital 2016).

II.

Key Design Decisions

1. Treasury committed financing to Chrysler Financial from TARP using EESA based
on the idea that Chrysler Financial’s existence was intractably intertwined with
Chrysler’s.
It should be noted that at first President Bush and Secretary Paulson did not believe that
Congress had authorized TARP funds to be used for an auto bailout since the act was
generally thought to be targeted to the financial industry (Wiggins, Metrick, and Nye 2021,
12). In broad terms, TARP authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase “troubled
assets” from “financial institutions” (Wiggins, Metrick, and Nye 2021, 12). However, while
descriptive, the definitions are not entirely restrictive and in particular, the definition of
“troubled assets” can be expanded by determination of the Secretary of the Treasury in
accordance with certain procedures set out in the statute. (Wiggins, Metrick, and Nye 2021,
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12). The definition of financial institutions is arguably broad enough to include the auto
manufacturers, as the Secretary determined (Wiggins, Metrick, and Nye 2021, 12). Among
other arguments, President Bush and Secretary Paulson relied on the nexus between GM and
Chrysler and their respective finance companies, GMAC and Chrysler Financial, and the
critical role that financing played in the industry to support funding under TARP for all four
companies.
The official determination by the Secretary of Treasury that authorized TARP funding for
auto manufacturers defined “certain […] companies […] engaged in the manufacturing of
automotive vehicles and the provision of credit in connection with the manufacturing and
purchase of such vehicles” as “financial institutions” for the sake of EESA (Secretary of
Treasury 2008, PDF p. 1). This enabled Treasury to purchase the “troubled assets” of
Chrysler Financial. This decision was criticized by some (Wiggins, Metrick, and Nye 2021).
When litigation over the bankruptcy court’s approval of Chrysler’s restructuring reached the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Treasury expounded on the Secretary’s determination:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury, in determining what is a financial institution, looks
at the interrelatedness [of the company and its financing arm].
Chrysler Financial can’t survive without Chrysler . . . . Without [Chrysler], the financial
institution goes down . . . . [Chrysler Financial] is the financial institution and the
relationship [with Chrysler is the one] that the Secretary of the Treasury based his
determination on, and that determination is entitled to deference by this court under
administrative law principles (COP 2009, 75–76).
(See COP 2009, 70, and Wiggins, Metrick, and Nye 2021, 11–15, for a discussion of the use of
TARP for the auto industry.)
2. The support for Chrysler Financial was part of a multi-faceted program to assist
Chrysler and GM.
Under the auspices of the AIFP, the government would ultimately provide funding to not only
the auto manufacturers and auto finance companies but also to other related stakeholders
such as suppliers and customers. Because of the interdependence of companies in the
industry, such aid was thought necessary to ensure both the success of the restructuring
plans and the survival of the manufacturers. Assistance was provided to suppliers, to finance
companies to maintain financing for new car purchases, and to special purpose vehicles that
guaranteed warranties on new cars. The government also helped the two auto companies
restructure using the bankruptcy code, committing billions of dollars in debtor-inpossession and post-petition financing (Klier and Rubenstein 2013, 148–150).
3. Treasury authorized $1.5 billion in lending to aid Chrysler Financial’s consumer
financing.
As part of Chrysler’s requests for aid from TARP, the manufacturer had asked for $2.5 billion
to aid Chrysler Financial’s floorplan and consumer financing operations (Kolka 2009, 30).
This was subsequently lowered to a request for $1.5 billion in aid that would be allocated
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exclusively to consumer financing (Kolka 2009, 30). On January 16, 2009, days after Chrysler
complained about being put at an “competitive disadvantage” by Treasury’s announcement
of up $6 billion in aid for Chrysler Financial’s competitor, GMAC, Treasury announced $1.5
billion in aid from TARP to Chrysler Financial to improve consumer access to credit and
stimulate Chrysler auto sales Treasury 2009a). The $1.5 billion was a relatively small amount
compared with the $6 billion commitment to GMAC (Canis et al. 2009, 48). However, the $1.5
billion commitment for Chrysler Financial and the $6 billion committed to GMAC were in
addition to the initial $17.4 billion authorized by the Bush administration for aid to
automotive companies (White House 2008).
Despite the Treasury’s commitment to Chrysler Financial, several dealerships complained
about the lack of support for floorplan financing. While the $1.5 billion Chrysler Financial
Trust Loan and facility could stimulate consumer financing, dealerships found it increasingly
difficult to finance their inventories (Kellogg 2009a; Wernle 2009). However, additional
funding was not forthcoming from Treasury, possibly because Treasury and Chrysler wished
to shrink Chrysler’s dealer network which both considered to be oversized and unprofitable
(Rattner 2011, 194).
4.

The Chrysler Financial Trust loan had a five-year term but could be prepaid.

The term of the $1.5 billion loan to Chrysler Financial Trust was slightly shorter than the
common loan terms for automobile asset-backed securities in a normal market (for example,
72 months in 2016) (Lei et al. 2017). The term was also longer than that on the three-year
term loans TALF announced at the close of 2008, which would have made it more attractive
than waiting for TALF to be implemented (Leinfuss 2008).
Treasury also allowed Chrysler Financial to prepay its advances under the Chrysler Financial
Trust loan in whole or in part (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7, 11).
However, in the event of any prepayment, Chrysler Financial had to make Treasury whole
for any losses or costs that it suffered in redeploying funds maintained for advances
(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7, 11).
5. Chrysler retail auto financing had to comply with certain terms to benefit from the
Chrysler Financial Trust loan and financing program.
The Master Auto Finance Agreement Term Sheet describing the financing program (MAFA
Term Sheet) stated that financing extended to retail consumers on or after January 1, 2009,
which meet “certain geographic, credit quality and other standard overconcentration limits.”
(Chrysler Group LLC and GMAC 2009, Treasury 2009a, PDF p. 1). However, beyond the
eligibility date for retail loans, more information on this topic does not appear in the Chrysler
Financial Loan Agreement itself. (Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009).
It is unclear why Treasury settled on January 1, 2009, as the earliest eligible date, as the
Chrysler Financial Trust loan was executed on January 16, 2009 (Treasury 2009, PDF p. 1).
However, this date is consistent with a goal of having the Chrysler Financial Trust loan
stimulate new auto purchases, rather than subsidizing existing ones. There is no publicly
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available information on additional requirements, how they were enforced, or why they
were put in place.
6.

The legal structure of the Chrysler Financial Trust loan and facility mimicked that
of an auto securitization, with the Treasury playing the role of the bond-buying
investor.

The legal structure is important because it was a much more complicated structure for
lending than that of any of the other programs under the AIFP. However, there is no public
information available to explain why this structure was chosen (GM Financial n.d.).
The interest and principal of the $1.5 billion Chrysler Financial Trust loan was secured by
the receivables and related property arising from the auto loans that Chrysler Financial
would be making to retail customers Treasury 2009a). These receivables would have
included the proceeds of defaulted customer loans that were subsequently liquidated.
Treasury n.d., PDF pp. 3–4).
7. Treasury could transfer the Chrysler Financial Trust loan, but the Chrysler
Financial Trust faced restrictions on hypothecating the loan’s underlying
collateral.
Treasury could engage in repurchase agreements with or pledge the collateral received in
connection with the Chrysler Financial Trust loan (by way of Chrysler Financial Trust)
(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF p. 27). However, Chrysler Financial
Trust was prohibited from assigning (in addition to selling, transferring, hypothecating, etc.)
any of its obligations or rights under the loan without Treasury’s prior written consent
(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 26–27). In theory, this could have
kept Chrysler Financial from diverting the proceeds of the loan and would have centralized
liability for violating the agreement in Chrysler Financial Trust. Also, these terms allowed
Treasury to transfer the loan to another party if need be.
8.

The Chrysler Financial Trust Loan had lower interest rates than Chrysler
Financial’s other recent loans but had significant terms that would trigger
penalty interest rates.

The Chrysler Financial Trust loan had an interest rate of the one-month LIBOR plus 100 basis
points for the first year and the one-month LIBOR plus 150 basis points for the second
through fifth years. The interest rate was significantly less than what Chrysler Financial had
to pay when it renewed its $24 billion credit line in August 2008 (Bansal and Krolicki 2008)
and less than what Chrysler paid to Treasury under the Bridge Loan (Nye 2021a). However,
the Class B promissory notes to be issued by the trust with respect to any advance under the
Chrysler Financial Trust Loan provided further upside to Treasury for extending the loan to
Chrysler Financial, worth as much as 5% of the advance amount.
The Chrysler Financial Trust loan also provided for penalty rates in cases of default or
overdue payments (Chrysler Financial and Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 7–8). The loan added 300
basis points to the interest rate for overdue payments (resulting in a penalty rate of 400 basis
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points in year one and 450 basis points in years two through five). The penalty was
significantly smaller than the one imposed under the auto Bridge Loans to the manufacturers
Chrysler and GM, which added a 500 basis point penalty (Nye 2021a).
9. Treasury received the Class B notes as additional consideration for its
commitments.
The Class B promissory notes served as an alternative method for fulfilling EESA Section
113(d)(1)(b)’s requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury could only purchase the
troubled assets of financial institutions that do not have their securities traded on a national
securities exchange if the Secretary of Treasury received “a warrant for common or
preferred stock, or a senior debt instrument” from the financial institution in question
Treasury n.d., PDF p. 4; EESA, § 113). Because Chrysler Financial was a private company, it
did not have its securities traded on a national securities exchange at that time. The Class B
promissory notes fulfilled the requirement as a “senior debt instrument” that would act as
additional consideration with respect to the $1.5 billion loan (EESA, § 113; Picarillo and
Laterza 2009).16 The Class B notes carried Maturity and interest rate terms and conditions
that were similar to the Class A notes. The Class B Note issued to Treasury had a face value
of $75 million—set at 5% of the maximum loan amount—and would vest over five years,
with $15 million vested on issuance and an additional $15 million vesting annually on the
anniversary of issuance while the loan was outstanding (Chrysler Financial Services and
Treasury 2009, PDF pp. 145–146, 171–187; Treasury 2009a, PDF p. 4).
10. Chrysler Financial was subject to restrictions on its executive compensation.
The press release announcing the Chrysler Financial Trust Loan and financing program
indicated that Chrysler Financial would be required to “be in compliance with the executive
compensation and corporate governance requirements of Section 111 of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act, as well as enhanced restrictions on executive compensation”
Treasury 2009a). The accompanying Loan Term Sheet included a requirement that bonuses
of senior executive officers (SEOs) and senior employees for the 2009 fiscal year be reduced
to no more than 60% of their 2007 levels Treasury n.d., PDF p. 3). It is worth noting that this
condition appears to be more onerous than the restrictions imposed on Chrysler and GM,
which were subject to ESSA provisions but not to specific compensation caps.
EESA Section 111, provided for review of compensation by the Special Master for TARP
Executive Compensation (the “Special Master”) “to determine whether the compensation
structure for each senior executive officer and certain most highly compensated employees
‘will or may result in payments inconsistent with the purposes of section 11 of EESA or TARP,
or [is] otherwise contrary to the public interest (31 C.F.R. §30.16(a)(3)) (Treasury 2015, 1,
6).” This is often referred to as the Public Interest Standard (Treasury 2015, 6). The executive

16 The author inferred that the

purpose of the Class B Notes was to satisfy the TARP requirements because there
was a lack of other instruments within the assistance for Chrysler Financial that would fulfill such requirements
and because the language Treasury used for the Class B Notes in the Loan Term Sheet is similar to the language
it used for the Additional Notes in the Bridge Loans term sheets.
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compensation of the SEOs of Chrysler and GM were also subject to such review (Feinberg
2009). As required, on October 22, 2009, the Special Master issued its review of Chrysler
Financial’s proposed executive compensation, which took into account that at the time, the
company was “following Treasury’s directive to liquidate its business in an orderly fashion”
(Treasury 2015, A5).
The Special Master was found that the company proposed cash salaries that represented
decreases from 2008 levels of between 10% to 67% for its SEOs and highly compensated
employees. Total cash compensation for this group would be reduced by 30% from 2008
levels and total compensation would be reduced by 56%. The Special Master found these
terms to be consistent with the Public Interest Standard (Treasury 2015, 1, A6). The Special
Master also limited all other compensation and perquisites to no more than $25,000 and
ordered that there be no increases in severance arrangements. The Special Master also ruled
that severance paid in excess of its ruling would have to be reclaimed (Treasury 2015, A7).
The Special Master found that the proposed compensation for the company’s other highly
compensated employees (the 26th through 100th highly compensated employees) was
consistent with the rule (Feinberg 2009).
11. The loan agreement provided for a Class C Note that was ultimately never used.
The inclusion of a provision for Class C Notes anticipated that Chrysler Financial might
arrange for supplemental subordinated loans. The third-party holders of these loans would
receive Class C Notes to represent the funding that they provided. The Class C Notes would
accrue interest and would be subordinate to the Class A and Class B Notes, with related
secondary payment priorities. However, we have not been able to determine why these
provisions were never used or why the credit enhancement and hedging contemplated by
the Class C Notes were given such attention in the Chrysler Financial Loan Agreement.
(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 20009).
12.

Chrysler Holding offered a limited guarantee of Chrysler Financial that served as
a claw back mechanism in some cases of noncompliance.

Pursuant to the Chrysler Financial Trust loan agreement, Chrysler Financial was required to
suspend payment of dividends while the loan was outstanding and could incur certain
penalties payable to Treasury. Chrysler Holding, Chrysler Financial’s parent company,
guaranteed to any amounts paid to it by Chrysler Financial in violation of the dividend and
distribution restrictions Treasury n.d., PDF p. 3). This functioned as a claw back provision in
the event that amounts due to Treasury were not properly paid.
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Treasury communicated the support for Chrysler Financial providing details of the loan and
its intended purpose.
In January 2009, Treasury released a short press release announcing the Chrysler Financial
Trust loan and financing program for new vehicle purchases and also providing the Loan
Term Sheet. Treasury 2009a, Treasury 2009a). The press release described the loan as “a
$1.5 billion loan to a special purpose entity created by Chrysler Financial to finance the
extension of new consumer auto loans […] secured by a senior secured interest in a pool of
newly originated consumer automotive loans” Treasury n.d.). Treasury also noted that
Chrysler Financial would have to comply with the executive compensation and corporate
governance restrictions under EESA in addition to “enhanced restrictions on executive
compensation” Treasury 2009a). (Treasury also later published some (redacted) loan
documents.)
In March, in its Determination of Viability for Chrysler, Treasury foreshadowed the need for
Chrysler to modify its auto financing arrangement with Chrysler Financial describing
Chrysler Financial as having “substantial financing challenges of its own” such that “future
demand may depend on Chrysler finding alternate lending sources” (Treasury 2009b, PDF
p. 5). Treasury also pointed to Chrysler Financial’s “separation and independence” from
Chrysler as a barrier to increasing demand for Chrysler’s cars (Treasury 2009b, PDF p. 5).
This foreshadowing came to fruition when, in connection with Chrysler entering bankruptcy
in April, it entered into a new financing arrangement with GMAC.
13. Treasury indirectly subsidized GMAC’s assumption of Chrysler Financial’s auto
financing relationship with Chrysler.
When Chrysler entered bankruptcy on April 30, 2009, Chrysler Financial did not join the
action (Kellogg and Bennett 2009). However, a large portion of Chrysler Financial’s assets
were sold to, and its floorplan finance operations taken over by, GMAC, the former captive,
and then current, financing arm of General Motors, also then controlled by Cerberus (COP
2010, 59). Treasury supported this reorganization and indirectly subsidized both GMAC and
Chrysler Financial during the transition.
Rather than directly enter into a loss-sharing facility with GMAC, on May 15, 2009, Treasury
and Export Development Canada amended their debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan17 to
Chrysler, increasing the $4.1 billion facility by $896 million and the Treasury increased its
funding to GMAC by $7.5 billion to “support GMAC's ability to originate new loans to Chrysler
dealers and consumers and help address GMAC's capital needs as identified through the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)” (Chrysler LLC and Lenders 2009, PDF p.
21; Docket 1903 2009; Treasury 2009c).
As for Chrysler Financial, some of the increased DIP loan would also be used to effectively
pay the company to cap its potentially large “superpriority administrative expense claims”
The debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan was a three-way agreement between Chrysler, Treasury, and Export
Development Canada (EDC) dated May 5, 2009 (Chrysler LLC and Lenders 2009, PDF p. 21). See Nye 2021b for
details.
17
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and pay for an agreement that Chrysler’s post-bankruptcy successor (which would later be
known as New Chrysler) would assume Chrysler’s obligations under the Risk Sharing
Agreement between Chrysler and Chrysler Financial after Chrysler successfully restructured
(Docket 6273 2009, PDF p. 62).18

III. Evaluation
There has not been much academic discussion of the Chrysler Financial support on a standalone basis, so it is difficult to assess its separate impact. However, there is some evidence
that it fulfilled its original purpose “to finance the extension of new consumer auto loans as
part of a broader program to assist the domestic automotive industry in becoming financially
viable.”
Once the Chrysler Financial Trust loan was executed, sales of Chrysler vehicles ticked up
slightly in February 2009 (+4,501), showed a major boost in March (+34,343), and stabilized
somewhere in the mid-70,000 units per month range (–24,219) in April after the loan was
fully drawn down (data from PR Newswire 2009a-d). However, the drop in sales in April may
have occurred because some Chrysler Financial loan rates increased by over 1% as the loan
was fully drawn that month (Kellogg 2009b). By then, however, the TALF was operational,
which allowed Chrysler Financial to continue securitizing new loans. Thus, given its limited
purpose, the Chrysler financial Trust loan and financing program can be said to have
achieved its goal of maintaining and even stimulating Chrysler vehicle sales as the
government worked with the company on a broader rescue plan.
Once TALF was available, Chrysler Financial was able to use TALF to fund an exit from the
Chrysler Financial Trust loan (Langlois 2009).19 Commentators note that the TALF seemed
to improve the liquidity of the auto ABS market with triple-A-rated auto ABS spreads
plummeting in the month after its December 2008 second announcement (Rhee 2020).
Besides an uptick in sales (which could have been due to TALF), there does not seem to have
been any significant public reaction to the Chrysler Financial Trust loan and financing
program.
It’s unclear how the Chrysler Financial Trust loan and financing program impacted Chrysler
Financial other than in increased sales. Even as Chrysler announced that the loan allowed
customers with credit scores as low as the 620s “to apply for affordable loans,” sales
continued to decline for Chrysler relative to 2008 (Shepardson and Priddle 2009). The
impact of the loan and financing program is also obscured by the fact that Chrysler and
The superpriority administrative expense claims were Chrysler’s obligations to Chrysler Financial related to
the management of its bankruptcy proceedings; they enjoyed a high payment priority under 11 US
Code § 503,507. Under the Risk Sharing Agreement, Chrysler would convey the $1.5 billion in collateral to
Chrysler Financial and commit to several other agreements in favor of Chrysler Financial in exchange for
Chrysler waiving the “new liens” prohibition (Docket 483, PDF pp. 9–10, 12).
19 One commentator alleged that the loan to Chrysler Financial “[was] also intended as a bridge to further
funding from a $200bn Federal Reserve programme intended to support consumer credit,” in other words,
TALF (Dombey and Simon 2009).
18
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Chrysler Financial behaved more independently from each other in early 2009 than Treasury
had anticipated. Chrysler Financial provided wholesale financing to 62% of Chrysler
dealerships and handled 50% of Chrysler’s consumer financing (Docket 483, PDF p. 8).
However, Chrysler Financial seemed to have a relationship with Chrysler defined more by
conflict than by cooperation. While Chrysler attempted to sell the vehicles piling up in its
inventory to dealerships, there were multiple media reports of Chrysler Financial’s
attempting to frustrate dealership access to the floorplan financing they needed to purchase
vehicles from Chrysler (Kellogg 2009a; Wernle 2009).

IV.
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Key Program Documents
Summary of Program
(Treasury n.d.) Automotive Industry Financing Program Chrysler LB Receivables Trust
Secured Term Loan Summary of Terms
Treasury document outlining the initially proposed terms of lending to Chrysler Financial’s ABS
master trust, Chrysler LB Receivables Trust.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/011608%20term%20sheet
%20chrysler%20fin.pdf.
Implementation Documents
(Chrysler Financial Services and Treasury 2009) Chrysler Financial Loan Agreement
(January 14, 2009)
Agreements executing lending to the Chrysler Financial ABS master trust which includes
documents setting up the ABS master trust, a Trust Indenture, a Depositor Agreement, a Sale
and Servicing Agreement, a Limited Guarantee Agreement, a Trust Agreement, and a Purchase
Agreement.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/05202009chrysler_financial_1.pdf.
(Chrysler Holding and Treasury 2008) Chrysler Original Loan and Security Agreement (with
amendments) (December 31, 2008)
Agreements (including amendments) to execute lending to Chrysler by Treasury.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/2009-0102%20to%202010-05-26%20Chrysler%20LSA%20as%20of%2005-26-10.pdf.
(Treasury 2009b) “Determination of Viability Summary: Chrysler, LLC” (March 30 2009)
Short evaluation of Chrysler’s viability plan as well as the conditions under which the
government will grant Chrysler further funding. It assumes Chrysler Financial’s continued
independence.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Chrysler-ViabilityAssessment_1.pdf.
Legal/Regulatory Guidance
(Feinberg 2009) Re: Proposed Compensation Payments and Structures for Senior Executive
Officers and Most Highly Compensated Employees (03/23/2010)
Guidance on Chrysler Financial executive compensation and details on the plans for winding
down Chrysler Financial.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/20100323%20Chrysler%20
Financial%202010%20Top%2025%20Determi nation%20(3-23-10).pdf.
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Press Releases/Announcements
(Treasury 2009a) Treasury Announces TARP Investments in Chrysler Financial ()
January 16, 2009, statement announcing aid to Chrysler Financial that summarizes the terms
of the loans.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Treasury%20Announces%2
0TARP%20Investments%20in%20Chrysler%20Financial.pdf.
Reports
(Canis et al. 2009) US Motor Vehicle Industry: Federal Financial Assistance and
Restructuring (05/29/2009)
Congressional Research Service analysis of the lead-up to and execution of the auto industry
bailout as well as the various solutions for restructuring.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/CRS%20Auto%20Governm
ent%20Aid.pdf.
(COP 2009) September Oversight Report: The Use of TARP Funds in the Support and
Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive Industry
Congressional Oversight Panel analyzing and providing recommendations related to the
creation, implementation, and issues raised by the use of TARP funds in the automotive bailout.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/Congressional_Oversight_Pa
nel_September_2009_Report_20090909.pdf.
(COP 2010) March Oversight Report: The Unique Treatment of GMAC Under the TARP
Congressional Oversight Panel analysis of the use of TARP funds in the support of GMAC and
Chrysler Financial. Analysis centers on GMAC but also covers Chrysler Financial in spring 2009.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cop_report_20100310.pdf.
(COP 2011) January Oversight Report: An Update on TARP Support for the Domestic
Automotive Industry
Congressional Oversight Panel updating analysis and recommendations related to the creation,
implementation, and issues raised by the automotive bailout.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/cop_report_20110113.pdf.
(GAO 2009a) Troubled Asset Relief Program: Continued Stewardship Needed as Treasury
Develops Strategies for Monitoring and Divesting Financial Interests in Chrysler and GM
Oversight report detailing the conditions of the support provided to the automotive industry
and evaluating the government’s actions in the auto rescue through November 2009. This
includes the first mention by the GAO of Chrysler Financial’s wind-down.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/297972.pdf.
(GAO 2009c) Financial Audit: Office of Financial Stability (Troubled Asset Relief Program)
Fiscal Year 2009 Financial Statements
December 2009 oversight report that includes the first mention by the GAO of the date that
Chrysler Financial reached the maximum loan amount.
https://ypfsresourcelibrary.blob.core.windows.net/fcic/YPFS/299252.pdf.
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